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This paper extends a probabilistic voting model with a multidimensional policy space, allowing
candidates to have diﬀerent prior probability distributions of the distribution of voters’ ideal
policies. In this model, we show that a platform pair is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both
candidates choose a common generalized median of expected ideal policies. Thus, the existence
of a Nash equilibrium requires not only that each candidate’s belief have an expected generalized
median, which is already a knife-edge condition, but also that the two medians coincide. We
also study limits of ϵ-equilibria of Radner (1980) as ϵ ! 0, which we call “limit equilibria.”
Limit equilibria are policy pairs that approximate choices by the candidates who almost perfectly
optimize. We show that a policy pair is a limit equilibrium if and only if both candidates choose
the same policy around which they form “opposite expectations” in a certain sense. For a limit
equilibrium to exist (equivalently, for ϵ-equilibria to exist for all ϵ > 0), it is suﬃcient, though not
necessary, that either candidate has an expected generalized median.
1 Introduction
In real elections, candidates often choose their electoral platforms without knowing the
exact preference distribution of the electorate. What policy choices constitute Nash
equilibria in such situations? To describe and analyze this case, we need probabilistic
voting models in which candidates have beliefs (i.e., prior probability distributions)
of the preference distribution. Most of the probabilistic voting models assume that
candidates have a common belief. Under this assumption, when the policy space is
multidimensional, the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium often requires
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1a quite strong condition on the belief. It is natural to ask under what condition an
equilibrium exists if candidates have diﬀerent beliefs. In this paper, we try to answer
this question.
We extend a standard two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a multidi-
mensional policy space, allowing the candidates to have diﬀerent beliefs. In general,
diﬀerences between beliefs may arise from diﬀerences in information, experiences, and
other personal characteristics. In electoral competition, the large degree of freedom in
assigning a probability to every possible proﬁle of voters’ preferences may add scope
for belief diﬀerences. Candidates may form beliefs from their private polls. Duggan,
Bernhardt, and Squintani (2007) study this case in a Bayesian-game setting. Candi-
dates also may draw diﬀerent subjective inferences from the same public data on voters’
preferences.
We consider a probabilistic voting model with a multidimensional compact, convex
policy space, two vote-maximizing candidates, and a continuum of voters. The candi-
dates believe that each voter i has some ideal policy xi such that he prefers policies
closer to xi. They have beliefs on the distribution of ideal policies. We assume that
each candidate’s belief induces a distribution of expected ideal policies which has a
density function on the policy space with full support.
In the common-belief case of this model, results shown by Plott (1967) and Calvert
(1980) can be applied to fully characterize Nash equilibria: platforms of the candidates
constitute a Nash equilibrium if and only if both candidates locate at an “expected
generalized median” with respect to the belief. An expected generalized median is
deﬁned as a policy x such that any hyperplane containing x divides the policy space into
halfspaces with equal proportions of expected ideal policies. Thus, a Nash equilibrium
exists if and only if the common belief has an expected generalized median. Under our
assumptions, any belief has at most one expected generalized median. If the policy
space has only one dimension, all beliefs have an expected generalized median, as
it is a median in the usual sense of expected ideal policies. If the policy space has
multiple dimensions, then the existence of an expected generalized median is extremely
restrictive.
We show that even in the case with non-common beliefs, the characterization of Nash
equilibria, together with the condition for the existence of them, remains essentially the
same. More precisely, in the model with non-common beliefs, a platform pair is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if both candidates locate at a common expected generalized
2median. Thus, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if both candidates’ beliefs have
expected generalized medians, and the two medians coincide. For example, even if the
policy space is unidimensional, no Nash equilibrium exists whenever the candidates’
expected medians diﬀer. Hence, allowing for non-common beliefs does not substantially
expand the set of pairs of the candidates’ beliefs for which Nash equilibria exist. We
are thus led to consider a solution weaker than Nash equilibria.
We study “epsilon-equilibria” of Radner (1980). For ϵ ≥ 0, a platform pair is
called an ϵ-equilibrium if each candidate’s platform gives him an expected vote share
within ϵ of the maximum that he can get given the opponent’s platform. In previous
papers on political competition, only Nash equilibria (ϵ-equilibria for ϵ = 0) have been
studied. In our model, the candidates’ best response correspondences have empty values
almost everywhere: while each candidate can gain by getting closer to the opponent’s
position y, locating exactly at y is never optimal for him unless it is an expected
generalized median with respect his belief. Weakening the strict maximization behavior
of the candidates allows us to deal with nonempty-valued approximate best response
correspondences.
We characterize limits of ϵ-equilibria as ϵ → 0, which we simply call “limit equilib-
ria.” Limit equilibria are policy pairs that approximate choices by the candidates who
almost perfectly optimize. We show that a platform pair is a limit equilibrium if and
only if both candidates choose the same policy with “symmetric maximal normals.” We
say a policy z has symmetric maximal normals if the candidates can divide all votes by
cutting the policy space with some hyperplane containing x (one candidate receives all
votes from voters with ideal policies on one side of the hyperplane), so that no other
division with a hyperplane containing x makes either candidate better oﬀ according to
his own belief. In the common-belief case, a policy has symmetric maximal normals if
and only if it is an expected generalized median; hence limit equilibria coincide with
Nash equilibria. The characterization of limit equilibria implies that an ϵ-equilibrium
exists for every ϵ > 0 if and only if a policy with symmetric maximal normals exists.
In contrast to the condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium (i.e., the existence
of a common expected generalized median), the existence of a policy with symmetric
maximal normals only requires that there be a relation between the candidates’ beliefs,
and imposes no independent constraint on each candidate’s belief. In particular, each
candidate’s expected generalized median has symmetric maximal normals. Thus, for an
ϵ-equilibrium to exist for every ϵ > 0, it is suﬃcient, though not necessary, that either
3candidate has an expected generalized median. If the policy space is unidimensional,
then, since the candidates have expected medians, ϵ-equilibria exist for all ϵ > 0. In
fact, in this case, all policies between the candidates’ expected medians have symmetric
maximal normals.
The result on limit equilibria implies that only very close platforms can constitute
an ϵ-equilibrium for very small ϵ > 0. We thus ﬁnd that diﬀerences between the can-
didates’ beliefs alone do not generate policy divergence in Nash equilibrium, and this
is approximately true even if the candidates’ behavior deviates slightly from perfect
optimization. In contrast, Wittman (1983) and Roemer (2001) show that in proba-
bilistic voting models in which the candidates have diﬀerent policy preferences, at any
Nash equilibrium (if it exists), the candidates must choose diﬀerent platforms. This
comparison indicates that candidates’ beliefs on the electorate and their preferences
over policy outcomes have qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects on their policy choices.
There are two recent papers that take new approaches to candidates’ behavior under
uncertainty. Bade (2011) constructs a multidimensional probabilistic voting model
in which candidates are uncertainty averse. Each candidate has multiple beliefs on
voters’ preferences and seeks to maximize the minimum expected vote share, where
the minimum is taken over the possible beliefs. Under some restrictions on the sets
of beliefs held by the candidates and on the dimensionality of the policy space, Bade
shows the existence of an equilibrium. As her focus is on uncertainty aversion, it does
not fully cover the case where each candidate has a single belief, but the beliefs are
diﬀerent between the candidates. The present paper focuses on this case.
Another approach is taken by Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2007). In a uni-
dimensional setting, they assume that candidates receive noisy private signals of the
median ideal policy. While the candidates have a common prior belief of the me-
dian ideal policy, diﬀerent signals lead them to diﬀerent posterior beliefs. They show
that while a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium often does no exist, a mixed strategy
Bayesian equilibrium exists generally. As the equilibrium platforms are contingent on
private signals, each candidate forms a probabilistic conjecture about the opponent’s
platform. We do not explicitly model such an informational aspect. Our model ﬁts
the case where it is relevant to assume that each candidate predicts the opponent’s
platform with certainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a probabilis-
tic voting with non-common beliefs, and deﬁne Nash equilibria and epsilon-equilibria
4of Radner (1980) in the model. In Section 3, we characterize Nash equilibria, and point
out that they often do not exist. In Section 4, we deﬁne limit equilibria and points
with symmetric maximal normals, characterize limit equilibria, and show conditions
for ϵ-equilibria to exist for any ϵ > 0. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
2 The Model
Our model consists of two candidates (candidates 1 and 2), a continuum of voters, the
policy space (i.e., the set of all policies) X, and candidate 1’s belief µ and candidate
2’s belief ν about the distribution of voters’ preferences.
The policy space X is a compact, convex subset of Rn with intX ̸= ∅.1
The belief µ of candidate 1 is a probability measure on Rn with the following inter-
pretation: candidate 1 believes that each voter has an ideal policy z ∈ X such that he
prefers policy x to policy y if and only if ∥x−z∥ < ∥y−z∥; the candidate does not ob-
serve voters’ ideal policies, and has a prior joint probability distribution of voters’ ideal
policies in the population; for each measurable A ⊂ Rn, the measure µ(A) represents
the expected proportion (with respect to his prior) of voters with ideal policies in A.
Similarly, the belief ν of candidate 2 is deﬁned and interpreted. We assume that µ and
ν are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and have support X.
Each candidate seeks to maximize the expected vote share with respect his belief
by choosing his electoral platform from the policy space X. Let πµ(x, y) denote the
expected vote share with respect to µ for policy x over policy y. We assume that
πµ(x, y) = 1
2 if x = y. Our assumptions on µ imply
πµ(x, y) =
{
µ{z ∈ Rn |∥x − z∥ < ∥y − z∥} if x ̸= y
1
2 if x = y.
Replacing µ with ν, the function πν is similarly deﬁned.
Our model is a game between candidates 1 and 2 in which if candidate 1 chooses
platform x ∈ X and candidate 2 chooses platform y ∈ X, then they get payoﬀs πµ(x, y)
and πν(y, x), respectively. A Nash equilibrium is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium
of this game.
1Throughout the paper, we endow Rn with the Euclidean inner product “·”, norm ∥∥, and topology (with intA and
clA denoting the interior and the closure of A).
5For each x ∈ Rn and a ∈ Rn \ {0}, denote by Hx,a the open halfspace
Hx,a = {z ∈ Rn |a · z > a · x}.
It is easy to check that µ(Hx,a) is continuous in (x, a) ∈ Rn × (Rn \ {0}). For each
(x, y) with x ̸= y, we have
πµ(x, y) = µ(H(x+y)/2,x y). (1)
The normal of any halfspace can be represented by a point in the (n − 1)-dimensional
unit sphere
S = {s ∈ Rn |∥s∥ = 1}.
A policy x is called a generalized median (in all directions) of µ if µ(Hx,s) = 1
2
for every s ∈ S. A generalized median of µ is interpreted as a generalized median
of expected ideal policies with respect to candidate 1’s prior. If µ has a generalized
median, then it is unique. If n = 1, then a generalized median is a median in the usual
sense.
Given ϵ ≥ 0, the ϵ-best response correspondence of candidate 1, Fµ(·, ϵ) : X → X,
is deﬁned by
Fµ(y, ϵ) = {x ∈ X |πµ(x, y) ≥ sup
z2X
πµ(z, y) − ϵ}.
A policy pair (x, y) is an ϵ-equilibrium if x ∈ Fµ(y, ϵ) and y ∈ Fν(x, ϵ). Nash equilibria
are exactly 0-equilibria.
3 Nash Equilibrium
To characterize Nash equilibria, we provide some notation and terminology. For each




As µ(Hy,s) is continuous, the function Πµ is continuous. A µ-maximal normal at
policy y is a vector s ∈ S such that µ(Hy,s) = Πµ(y). That is, among all halfspaces
whose boundaries contain y, the halfspace with a maximal normal has the maximum
µ-measure.
The following lemma is due to Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988).2
2Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988), Proposition 2. Their statement includes the assumption that µ has a concave density,
but their proof only uses the assumption that µ has a density function with convex support.
6Lemma 1. (Caplin and Nalebuﬀ, 1988) supz2X πµ(z, y) = Πµ(y) for every y ∈ X.
By (1), Lemma 1 implies that given candidate 2’s platform y, any suﬃciently high
expected vote share that candidate 1 can get is attained by locating close to y in the
direction of any µ-maximal normal at y.
Proposition 1. (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x = y = z, where z is a
generalized median of both µ and ν.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that Fµ(y, 0) ̸= ∅ if and only if y is a generalized median of µ,
in which case Fµ(y, 0) = {y} (because then the same statement with respect to belief
ν also holds). The “if” part directly follows from Lemma 1. To show the “only if”
part, suppose y is not a generalized median of µ. Fix any maximal normal s at y with
respect to µ. By choosing platform y +λs for suﬃciently small λ > 0, candidate 1 gets
an expected vote share greater than 1
2. Thus y is not a best response of candidate 1 to
y. His expected vote share becomes arbitrarily close to the supremum as λ approaches
0, while y is not optimal. Therefore Fµ(y, 0) = ∅.
The corollary below follows directly from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. A Nash equilibrium exists if and only if both candidates’ beliefs have
generalized medians, and the two generalized medians coincide.
When n ≥ 2, it is already quite restrictive that a candidate’s belief has a generalized
median. Corollary 1 says that the existence of a Nash equilibrium requires not only
that both candidates’ beliefs have generalized medians, but also that the two medians
coincide. Even if n = 1, no Nash equilibrium exists if the medians of µ and ν diﬀer.
Thus, allowing for diﬀerent beliefs does not substantially expand the possibility of the
existence of Nash equilibria.
4 Epsilon Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize “limit equilibria,” which are deﬁned as the limits of
ϵ-equilibria as ϵ → 0. Formally, a platform pair (x, y) is called a limit equilibrium if a
sequence (xk, yk, ϵk) in X × X × (0, ∞) exists such that (xk, yk) is an ϵk-equilibrium
for every k and (xk, yk, ϵk) → (x, y, 0) as k → ∞. A limit equilibrium is said to
have a direction s ∈ S if a sequence (xk, yk, ϵk) exists which, in addition to the above
7condition, satisﬁes that xk ̸= yk for every k and (xk − yk)/∥xk − yk∥ → s as k → ∞.
A limit equilibrium is not necessarily an equilibrium.
We say beliefs µ and ν have symmetric maximal normals at policy z if there exists a
normal s ∈ S at z which is µ-maximal and ν-minimal (i.e., −s is a ν-maximal normal
at z). Let Sz be the set of all s which are µ-maximal and ν-minimal at z. Let Z be
the set of all policies z at which the beliefs have symmetric maximal normals.
Sz = arg max
s2S
µ(Hz,s) ∩ arg min
s2S
ν(Hz,s), z ∈ X,
Z = {z ∈ X |Sz ̸= ∅}.
An example of a policy with symmetric maximal normals is a generalized median of
each candidate’s belief. To see this, suppose z is a generalized median of µ. Then all
s ∈ S are µ-maximal normals at z. As at least one ν-minimal normal at z exists, we
have Sz ̸= ∅.
If n = 1, under our assumptions, both candidates’ beliefs have a median. Hence
Z ̸= ∅. Moreover, if n = 1, Z is the interval between the medians of the candidates’
beliefs. To see this, let X = [0, 1], and zµ and zν be the medians of µ and ν, with
0 < zµ ≤ zν < 1. Then it is immediate that Sz = {−1} if z ∈ [zµ, zν], and Sz = ∅
otherwise.
Proposition 2. (x, y) is a limit equilibrium if and only if x = y ∈ Z. If (z, z) is a
limit equilibrium, then the set of its directions is Sz.
Proof. See Appendix.
We sketch the proof of Proposition 2. In the proof, we ﬁrst show that the distance
between any policy y and any ϵ-best response to y converges uniformly to 0 as ϵ → 0
(Lemma 2). This is due to the absolute continuity and the compact, convex supports of
beliefs. Thus any limit equilibrium must be a symmetric policy pair. This then implies
that for very small ϵ, the candidates must locate close to some policy z and almost best
respond to z. This occurs only if the beliefs have almost symmetric maximal normals
at z. Therefore, the limit of any sequence of ϵ-equilibria as ϵ → 0 must be (z, z) with
z ∈ Z. To show the converse, we note that the convexity of X ensures that given z ∈ Z
and s ∈ Sz, there is a policy pair of the form (y+λs, y) with λ > 0 which is arbitrarily
close to (z, z). By the absolute continuity, there is a sequence of ϵ-equilibria of this
form which converges to (z, z) as ϵ → 0.
8As a corollary of Proposition 2, we state a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an
ϵ-equilibrium to exist for every ϵ > 0.3
Corollary 2. An ϵ-equilibrium exists for every ϵ > 0 if and only if the candidates’
beliefs have symmetric maximal normals at some policy.
Proof. Suppose that an ϵ-equilibrium exists for every ϵ > 0. Let (ϵk) be a sequence such
that ϵk > 0 for every k and ϵk → 0. For each k, let (xk, yk) be an ϵk-equilibrium. Since
X ×X is compact, (xk, yk) has a subsequence converging to some (x, y) ∈ X ×X. By
Proposition 2, x = y ∈ Z. The converse follows directly from Proposition 2.
In contrast with the condition for the existence of Nash equilibria (Corollary 1),
which requires that the candidates beliefs have the same generalized median, the can-
didates’ beliefs may have symmetric maximal normals at some policy even if neither
belief has a generalized median. On the other hand, since a generalized median of
each candidate’s belief is in Z, for an ϵ-equilibrium to exist for any ϵ > 0, it suﬃces
that either candidate’s belief has a generalized median. This establishes the following
Corollary 3. However, we do not know a meaningful suﬃcient condition for the exis-
tence of ϵ-equilibria which holds without assuming that either candidate’s belief has a
generalized median.
Corollary 3. If at least one candidate’s belief has a generalized median, an ϵ-equilibrium
exists for every ϵ > 0. If n = 1, an ϵ-equilibrium exists for every ϵ > 0.
As Corollary 4 below shows, if the candidates have a common belief, then the con-
dition for an ϵ-equilibrium to exist for every ϵ > 0 is the same as the condition for a
Nash equilibrium to exist. Thus, it is not until we introduce belief diﬀerences between
the candidates that we have non-equivalence between the existence of Nash equilibria
and the existence of ϵ-equilibria for all ϵ > 0.
Corollary 4. If µ = ν, then an ϵ-equilibrium exists for every ϵ > 0 if and only if µ
(= ν) has a generalized median.
Proof. Clearly, Sz ̸= ∅ if and only if Πµ(z) = 1
2, which is equivalent to that z is a
generalized median of µ.
3There are papers that derive suﬃcient conditions for an ϵ-equilibrium to exist for every ϵ > 0 in more general
games with discontinuous payoﬀ functions (Radzik, 1991; Ziad, 1997; Carmona, 2010). Their conditions include upper
semicontinuity and (a strengthening of) quasiconcavity of payoﬀ functions, which often fail in our model.
95 Concluding Remarks
In a probabilistic voting model with non-common beliefs, we have shown that: (i) a
Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the candidates’ beliefs have the same expected
generalized median; (ii) an ϵ-equilibrium exists for every ϵ > 0 if and only if the
candidates’ beliefs have symmetric maximal normals at some policy. The condition
for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is essentially the same as in the model with a
common belief, and is quite restrictive in a multidimensional setting. The condition
for the existence of ϵ-equilibria is weaker than that at least one candidate’s belief has
an expected generalized median. Allowing for diﬀerent beliefs extends the possibility
of the existence of ϵ-equilibria, but not that of Nash equilibria.
We conjecture that when no candidate has an expected generalized median, the
candidates’ beliefs have symmetric maximal normals only if the beliefs are suﬃciently
distant (in terms of some relevant distance measurement). Thus a small deviation
from a common belief may not suﬃce for an ϵ-equilibrium to exist for arbitrarily small
ϵ > 0. It is interesting to clarify how large deviation from a common belief is necessary.
Furthermore, while we have focused on the limit behavior of ϵ-equilibria as ϵ → 0, it
is also appealing to study ϵ-equilibria for a ﬁxed ϵ. Further analysis of the model may
reveal the lower bound of ϵ above which an ϵ-equilibrium exists.
We have shown that any limit of ϵ-equilibria as ϵ → 0 is a symmetric policy pair
(z, z) such that the candidates’ beliefs have symmetric maximal normals at z. Around
such policy z, unless it is a common expected generalized median, the candidates have
opposing expectations (in some sense) on the voting outcome. Equilibria supported
by such conﬂicting expectations may not emerge as a steady state in a long period
involving many elections: if the candidates repeat the play of such an equilibrium in a
large number of elections (with some ﬁxed true preference distribution in the electorate),
then the resulting polls will force at least one candidate to revise his belief and change
his platform. Thus our prediction may be more appropriate for a short period between
one election and the next. Yet, the candidates’ entire beliefs need not converge in the
long run, since polls of past elections only reveal voters’ preferences over a small subset
of policies. The question of how the true preference distribution, experiences in past
elections, and candidates’ beliefs are related is a potential subject of future research.
106 Appendix
6.1 Lemma 2
The following lemma shows that the distance between any policy y and any ϵ-best
response to y converges uniformly to zero. For every ϵ > 0, deﬁne a function ∆µ(·, ϵ) :
X → R by
∆µ(y, ϵ) = sup
x2F(y,ϵ)
∥x − y∥.
Lemma 2. For any sequence (ϵk) of positive numbers with ϵk → 0, the sequence
(∆(·, ϵk)) converges uniformly to the constantly zero-valued function.
We divide the proof into two steps.
Step 1. For every ϵ > 0 and y ∈ X, clFµ(y, ϵ) = Fµ(y, ϵ) ∪ {y}. For every ϵ > 0, the
correspondence clFµ(·, ϵ) : X → X is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Let
ϕ(x, y) = sup
z2X
πµ(z, y) − πµ(x, y).
Then




Πµ(y) − µ(H(x+y)/2,x y) if x ̸= y,
Πµ(y) − 1
2 if x = y.
The function ϕ is continuous at every (x, y) with x ̸= y.
To show that y ∈ clFµ(y, ϵ) for every y ∈ X and ϵ > 0, ﬁx y ∈ X and s ∈ S with
µ(Hy,s) = Πµ(y). There is ¯ λ > 0 such that y + λs ∈ X for all λ ∈ (0, ¯ λ). If λk is a
sequence in (0, ¯ λ) with λk → 0, then
lim
k!1
ϕ(y + λks/2, y) = Πµ(y) − µ(Hy,s) = 0.
Thus for any ϵ > 0, there exists K such that for all k > K, ϕ(y + λks, y) ≤ ϵ, and
y + λk → y. Therefore y ∈ clFµ(y, ϵ).
Now, since ϕ is continuous at every (x, y) with x ̸= y, if xk ∈ Fµ(y, ϵ) for all k
and xk → x ̸= y, then ϕ(x, y) ≤ ϵ, and hence x ∈ Fµ(y, ϵ). Therefore clFµ(y, ϵ) =
Fµ(y, ϵ) ∪ {y}.
11To prove upper semicontinuity, consider sequences xk → x and yk → y with xk ∈
clFµ(yk, ϵ) for all k. If x = y, the ﬁrst part of the lemma directly implies x ∈ clFµ(y, ϵ).
If x ̸= y, then the continuity of ϕ at (x, y) implies x ∈ Fµ(y, ϵ).
Step 2. For every ϵ > 0, the function ∆µ(·, ϵ) : X → X is upper semicontinuous. For
every y ∈ X, limϵ!0 ∆µ(y, ϵ) = 0.
Proof. It is easy to see that Fµ(y, ϵ) \ {y} ̸= ∅ for any y ∈ X and any ϵ > 0. Thus by
Step 1,
∆µ(y, ϵ) = max
x2clF(y,ϵ)
∥x − y∥.
By Step 1, clFµ(·, ϵ) is upper semicontinuous, and has compact, nonempty values. Thus
by the maximum theorem for upper semicontinuous domain correspondences (Berge
(1963), Theorem 2, p.116), ∆µ(·, ϵ) is upper semicontinuous.
To show the last part, suppose the contrary. Then for some ϵk → 0 and some δ > 0,
there exists a sequence xk ∈ clFµ(y, ϵk) with ∥xk − y∥ > δ. Since X is compact,
(xk) has a subsequence converging to some x ∈ X. Then ∥x − y∥ ≥ δ and hence
x ̸= y. By the continuity of ϕ except on the diagonal, ϕ(x, y) = 0. For any λ ∈ (0, 1),
the convexity of X implies that λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ X and ϕ(λx + (1 − λ)y, y) < 0, a
contradiction.
Finally, Lemma 2 follows from Step 2 and Dini’s theorem on decreasing sequences
of upper semicontinuous functions (See Royden (1988), p.195).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We divide the proof into two steps.
Step 1. If (x, y) is a limit equilibrium, then x = y = z for some z ∈ Z. If (z, z) is a
limit equilibrium and z is not a generalized median of both µ and ν, then its direction
is in Sz.
Proof. By Lemma 2, if (x, y) is a limit equilibrium, then x = y = z for some z ∈ X. If
z is a generalized median of both µ and ν, then Sz = S, and hence z ∈ Z.
Now suppose that z is not a generalized median of µ. (The proof is the same when z
is not a generalized median of ν.) Let (xk, yk) be a sequence of ϵk-equilibria converging
to (z, z). By Lemma 1,
sup
z2X
πµ(z, yk) = Πµ(yk) → Πµ(z) > 1
2.
12Thus for K with ϵK < Πµ(z) − 1
2 and for every k > K, yk / ∈ Fµ(yk, ϵk), and hence
xk ̸= yk. For each k > K, let sk = (xk − yk)/∥xk − yk∥ ∈ S and suppose sk → s. By
the deﬁnition of ϵ-equilibrium, for all k > K,
0 ≤ Πµ(yk) − µ(H(xk+yk)/2,sk) ≤ ϵk,
0 ≤ ν(H(xk+yk)/2,sk) − (1 − Πν(xk)) ≤ ϵk.
(2)
Therefore, Πµ(z) = µ(Hz,s) and 1 − Πν(z) = ν(Hz,s). This implies s ∈ Sz and hence
z ∈ Z.
Step 2. For any z ∈ Z and s ∈ Sz, (z, z) is a limit equilibrium with direction s.
Proof. Let z ∈ Z and s ∈ Sz. Since X is convex and intX ̸= ∅, for any neighborhood
U of z there exist y ∈ U ∩ intX and λ > 0 with y + λs ∈ U ∩ X. Thus a sequence
(xi, yi) = (yi+λis, yi) in X×X exists such that λi > 0 for every i and (xi, yi) → (z, z)
as i → ∞. We have µ(H(xi+yi)/2,s) → µ(Hz,s) and Πµ(yi) → µ(Hz,s). Similarly,
ν(H(xi+yi)/2,s) → ν(Hz,s) and 1 − Πν(yi) → ν(Hz,s). Thus for every k, there exists i
such that (2) holds if we substitute (xi, yi) for (xk, yk) and s for sk. Thus we obtain
a subsequence (xik, yik) of (xi, yi) such that (xik, yik) is an ϵk-equilibrium for every
k.
If z is a generalized median of both µ and ν, then Sz = S. Thus by Step 2, any
direction of the limit equilibrium (z, z) is in Sz, ﬁnishing the proof of Proposition 2.
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